Re Olivera's good post, I want agree in that I had also, in the past, seen "romanticism" taken in its British sense as a response to the enlightenment. But as I have saud previously, as I looked at American legal history, I began to suspect that in America, enlightenement principles were somehow transmuted into attitudes that for want of a better word I could only call "romantic." I mean this to apply only to American law and I am not sure, as I have said, what that means fully. Some aspects I trace back to Herder and something like a "romanticism of place" and to some qualities of imagination applied to identity broadly. Some aspects are suggested by Bernard Bailyn's reading of early North American history and some to my own sense of the romance figures of Cooper. Some of it is suggested to me by Mary Shelley's recapitualtion of matters of language, imagination, and identity in _Frankenstein_. I need to read more specifically in all of this and in the romantic characteristics of the idea of property. Much of the "evidence" of what I am trying to tease out is in the actual language of laws of slavery and more speficially in judicial opinions from the antebellum south and the "scientific" canon of racialism that was contemporary to and influenced them. Finally, I am not sure that there is much direct relationship between American Legal Romanticism (my caps) and "American Romanticism" taken as a moment in American literary and cultural history, but I won't dismiss the possibility that such an argument can be made. All of the references given by JoEllen and Olivera seem very much to the point.
Chris
Friday, September 19, 2008
romanticism as enlightenment critique
coming into the conversation as someone who has thought about the meaning of 'romanticism' as a unifying term for a cluster of texts whose qualities were in some ways vastly different, i would be interested in hearing what the definition is of "american romanticism" and in what ways it differs from the british one while it keeps the same label. this question is of interest to me in part because of the pressure to resist what has been termed 'romantic ideology' and the legacy of texts' and writers' pressure on readers to read the texts without the permission to question the relationship between their ideological and textual qualities.
one of the most productive ways of thinking about romanticism for me has been as a critique of enlightenment: in its most canonical british iterations, romantic poems (think, 'lyrical ballads' and such) made it impossible not to see the tensions inherent in 'modernity' and argued (think preface to the 'lyrical ballads') how textual production and interpretation would bring about the social change in a world structured by textual production. these kinds of arguments always bring up conversations like the one we had last week, about who gets to participate, at what cost, and who gets to be excluded and pitied, but not necessarily helped or saved.
i will end at this: a very interesting recent 'commentary' on the inherent contradictions of enlightenment has been jonathan israel's enlightenment contested. in a review, robert leventhal, whose full text you can find here, explains that the value of israel's work is in pointing out to the significance of spinoza in the history of enlightenment, so that spinoza restored points to some of the irreconcilable differences within the "movement":
Enlightenment Contested is an attempt to shore up the idea that there are essentially two
Enlightenments, a "moderate mainstream" Enlightenment, which was morally, socially, and politically conservative, and apologetic if not outright supportive of absolutistic monarchy, and, on the other hand, the Radical Enlightenment. The Radical Enlightenment was responsible for, first and foremost, the emergence of liberal modernity in the eighteenth century and its rejection of ecclesiastical authority, its strict differentiation between truth and belief, philosophy and religion, its insistence on human equality regardless of race, gender, and class, and its demand for the absolute freedom of expression in the public sphere. Secondly, Enlightenment Contested is a not-so-implicit critique of modern trends in cultural history, cultural studies, "new social history," and sociology of knowledge. Focused not on the institutions, settings, milieux, written media, cultural contexts, or socioeconomic and political structures of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Israel is unapologetic about doing "high" intellectual history, a history of ideas, or Ideengeschichte. His argumentation seeks at every turn to show how Spinozism and spinozistic ideas, diffused and disseminated, repeatedly surface in the texts of Radical Enlightenment thinkers and threaten the existing sociopolitical and sociocultural order and how Spinoza and Spinozism represent the single most significant rupture with tradition and pave the way for the revolutions of the second half of the eighteenth century, not to mention our own democratic values, ideals, and aspirations even today.
one of the most productive ways of thinking about romanticism for me has been as a critique of enlightenment: in its most canonical british iterations, romantic poems (think, 'lyrical ballads' and such) made it impossible not to see the tensions inherent in 'modernity' and argued (think preface to the 'lyrical ballads') how textual production and interpretation would bring about the social change in a world structured by textual production. these kinds of arguments always bring up conversations like the one we had last week, about who gets to participate, at what cost, and who gets to be excluded and pitied, but not necessarily helped or saved.
i will end at this: a very interesting recent 'commentary' on the inherent contradictions of enlightenment has been jonathan israel's enlightenment contested. in a review, robert leventhal, whose full text you can find here, explains that the value of israel's work is in pointing out to the significance of spinoza in the history of enlightenment, so that spinoza restored points to some of the irreconcilable differences within the "movement":
Enlightenment Contested is an attempt to shore up the idea that there are essentially two
Enlightenments, a "moderate mainstream" Enlightenment, which was morally, socially, and politically conservative, and apologetic if not outright supportive of absolutistic monarchy, and, on the other hand, the Radical Enlightenment. The Radical Enlightenment was responsible for, first and foremost, the emergence of liberal modernity in the eighteenth century and its rejection of ecclesiastical authority, its strict differentiation between truth and belief, philosophy and religion, its insistence on human equality regardless of race, gender, and class, and its demand for the absolute freedom of expression in the public sphere. Secondly, Enlightenment Contested is a not-so-implicit critique of modern trends in cultural history, cultural studies, "new social history," and sociology of knowledge. Focused not on the institutions, settings, milieux, written media, cultural contexts, or socioeconomic and political structures of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Israel is unapologetic about doing "high" intellectual history, a history of ideas, or Ideengeschichte. His argumentation seeks at every turn to show how Spinozism and spinozistic ideas, diffused and disseminated, repeatedly surface in the texts of Radical Enlightenment thinkers and threaten the existing sociopolitical and sociocultural order and how Spinoza and Spinozism represent the single most significant rupture with tradition and pave the way for the revolutions of the second half of the eighteenth century, not to mention our own democratic values, ideals, and aspirations even today.
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
thanks, caroline, for putting this together and esp for the instructions about how to post... such a steep learning curve all day today for me! thanks, too, to joellen and chris for initiating such a thoughtful discussion... joellen raises a good point and question in essentially asking 'whose enlightenment" are we speaking about? and reminding us of montesquieu's influence and the complexities behind what we really mean when we're spk'g about "enlightenment" or "romanticism"... chris, you're absolutely on to something there...
jean
JoEllen on Romanticism and Enlightenment
A few thoughts …and apologies for subjecting you to my own hobbyhorses.I’m not sure if this is relevant anymore, but in the interest of furthering discussion I thought I would clarify why I objected to Chris’s definition of Romanticism. During the discussion, I thought he said that he traced Locke’s seventeenth-century ideas about property ownership and personhood through Scottish philosophers and British Romantic poetry and into American law. Although Locke certainly had a huge influence on American thought, I didn’t think Romantic poetry, in this instance, was being accurately represented. I study the Celtic poetry of the pre-Romantic period and Romantic fiction (i.e. Walter Scott and Maria Edgeworth). Poets like Oliver Goldsmith, Robert Burns, and James Macpherson wrote a lot about what humanity lost with the dissolution of common property (and groups like the Clan) and were very suspicious of property ownership, individuality, and the rise of commerce (3 huge topics).
The poets I study were, of course, hugely influential on the more canonical poets, such as Wordsworth, Blake, and Shelley.I also think it’s dangerous to generalize about the Enlightenment. The idea that there was a single Enlightenment has been challenge and largely dismantled in recent years by historians like J.G.A. Pocock. The Scottish Enlightenment and thinkers, such as Adam Smith and David Hume, have been sources scholars have turned to in this attempt to pluralize the Enlightenment. Although there are definitely intersections between Locke, Hume, and Smith, I also think they represent a different mode of Enlightenment thought. They drew much more heavily on Montesquieu than Locke. Also, Adam Smith and David Hume were skeptical about the idea of "progress." Hume called the individual nothing more than a “bundle of perceptions” and reason “a slave to the passions.” Although none of this helps clarify Chris’s definition (this is something beyond my paygrade and abilities), I want to do nothing more than complicate it. If I had more time, I would try and outline how property is valued differently among different Enlightenment thinkers. Ultimately, I may have misunderstood Chris’s definition of Romanticism, but it seemed to me that his definition ran the risk of creating Romantic poetry and Enlightenment thought as straw men for what I think is a really promising project about law and Romantic National Identity in the American context.There are several studies of Romantic national identity in the British context. Many of these studies draw on the idea of "internal colonialism," which also might be useful in the American context. I really admire Katie Trumpener’s _Bardic Nationalism_ (Princeton UP, 1997). I would also like to plug one of the most interesting pieces of criticism I have read in the past two years, Ian Baucom’s _Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History_ (Duke UP, 2005). Baucom’s book finds intersections between Enlightenment philosophy, British law, and Romantic fiction, poetry, and art. I would have to do more work on Enlightenment thought’s legal legacy in America, but (although I have not spent much time with his work) Knud Haaksonssen has written on this topic. He has a collection called _A Culture of Rights_ that might be or particular interest.Thanks to Chris for this welcome intellectual break from course preparation and grading!!________________________________________<
The poets I study were, of course, hugely influential on the more canonical poets, such as Wordsworth, Blake, and Shelley.I also think it’s dangerous to generalize about the Enlightenment. The idea that there was a single Enlightenment has been challenge and largely dismantled in recent years by historians like J.G.A. Pocock. The Scottish Enlightenment and thinkers, such as Adam Smith and David Hume, have been sources scholars have turned to in this attempt to pluralize the Enlightenment. Although there are definitely intersections between Locke, Hume, and Smith, I also think they represent a different mode of Enlightenment thought. They drew much more heavily on Montesquieu than Locke. Also, Adam Smith and David Hume were skeptical about the idea of "progress." Hume called the individual nothing more than a “bundle of perceptions” and reason “a slave to the passions.” Although none of this helps clarify Chris’s definition (this is something beyond my paygrade and abilities), I want to do nothing more than complicate it. If I had more time, I would try and outline how property is valued differently among different Enlightenment thinkers. Ultimately, I may have misunderstood Chris’s definition of Romanticism, but it seemed to me that his definition ran the risk of creating Romantic poetry and Enlightenment thought as straw men for what I think is a really promising project about law and Romantic National Identity in the American context.There are several studies of Romantic national identity in the British context. Many of these studies draw on the idea of "internal colonialism," which also might be useful in the American context. I really admire Katie Trumpener’s _Bardic Nationalism_ (Princeton UP, 1997). I would also like to plug one of the most interesting pieces of criticism I have read in the past two years, Ian Baucom’s _Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History_ (Duke UP, 2005). Baucom’s book finds intersections between Enlightenment philosophy, British law, and Romantic fiction, poetry, and art. I would have to do more work on Enlightenment thought’s legal legacy in America, but (although I have not spent much time with his work) Knud Haaksonssen has written on this topic. He has a collection called _A Culture of Rights_ that might be or particular interest.Thanks to Chris for this welcome intellectual break from course preparation and grading!!________________________________________<
Lit and Law and Romanticism
by Chris Suggs
I want to pass along to you some amplification of an issuethat JoEllen raised, in the light of some conversation I have had since our Sept 5 meeting.
JoEllen was disturbed at my appropriation of "romanticism" to describea shaping force in American law because the term is so closely tied inour practice to a) English literary romanticism, which it does notresemble very much at all; and b) American literary romanticism which it also does not seem to resemble but which itself is not the same as English literary romanticism. Bettina helpfully teased out of me thedeclaration that I meant nothing literary by the term but was arguing for something I should call "American legal romanticism."
This matter came up again this past weekend at Yale where I am amember of an interdisciplinary (well, law, legal history, and a littlebit of lit--me and Veronica)working group in law and slavery. There Iargued that certain Enlightenment principles, when translated into anemergent American legal context, became something "other than" Enlightenment and more Romantic, which I described more or less as ihad done in our seminar. The responses were surprising to me. One was that the historians didn't care one way or the other what it was called. That was a relief. But the other was that no one there could call up a single study that examined the effects of Enlightenment thought on American law, and certainly not whether there weresubstantive differences between the American product and the European original. At first I thought I had heard them incorrectly, but the point was made again. And finally there was some agreement that something may well have happened like that which I described but that no one had looked into it and that it should be done.
So, when JoEllen asked me on September 5 whose idea that was and I said I made it up, I was more correct than I knew, as far as I know. But I write to you now about it to claim once again that certain Enlightenment principles about individuality, will, liberty, and property we transmuted in America into a legal metadoctrine of romantic national identity from which blacks were systematically excluded through the normative power of positive law.
I want to pass along to you some amplification of an issuethat JoEllen raised, in the light of some conversation I have had since our Sept 5 meeting.
JoEllen was disturbed at my appropriation of "romanticism" to describea shaping force in American law because the term is so closely tied inour practice to a) English literary romanticism, which it does notresemble very much at all; and b) American literary romanticism which it also does not seem to resemble but which itself is not the same as English literary romanticism. Bettina helpfully teased out of me thedeclaration that I meant nothing literary by the term but was arguing for something I should call "American legal romanticism."
This matter came up again this past weekend at Yale where I am amember of an interdisciplinary (well, law, legal history, and a littlebit of lit--me and Veronica)working group in law and slavery. There Iargued that certain Enlightenment principles, when translated into anemergent American legal context, became something "other than" Enlightenment and more Romantic, which I described more or less as ihad done in our seminar. The responses were surprising to me. One was that the historians didn't care one way or the other what it was called. That was a relief. But the other was that no one there could call up a single study that examined the effects of Enlightenment thought on American law, and certainly not whether there weresubstantive differences between the American product and the European original. At first I thought I had heard them incorrectly, but the point was made again. And finally there was some agreement that something may well have happened like that which I described but that no one had looked into it and that it should be done.
So, when JoEllen asked me on September 5 whose idea that was and I said I made it up, I was more correct than I knew, as far as I know. But I write to you now about it to claim once again that certain Enlightenment principles about individuality, will, liberty, and property we transmuted in America into a legal metadoctrine of romantic national identity from which blacks were systematically excluded through the normative power of positive law.
Trial Balloon
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If you want to add a link/image to a site, you can click that option in the posting toolbar. If you want me to add a feature to the splash page (the first page that comes up when you get to the site), just let me know and I can do try to do it. (And you don't have to call me "Professor Reitz" -- I think I'm stuck with that since that's the username I use with my class blogs. Hey, it's better than "Mom," but I'll have to tell you that story another time.)
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